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Fanon, Colonial Violence, And Racist
Language In Federal American Indian Law
Joubin Khazaie*
This Comment will argue that the racist language enshrined in
foundational Supreme Court decisions involving Native tribes
continuously enacts a form of colonial violence that seeks to
preserve a white racial dictatorship. The paper will use Frantz
Fanon’s scholarship on colonial violence and the dehumanization
of Indigenous people as a framework to understand the history of
legalized racism against Indigenous people in the United States.
Fanon’s analysis allows us to understand how language is used
to dehumanize Native people in order to establish a system of
hierarchy that informs the societal roles of the colonizer and the
colonized. The paper will then trace the use of racial stereotypes
and brutalizing language against Native Americans in Supreme
Court decisions under Justice Marshall. Further, the paper will
argue that the racist precedents and language relied upon by the
Supreme Court have operated as a form of colonial violence that
serve to justify the denial of property, self–governance, and
cultural survival of Native Americans.

*
My thanks to my beloved partner Bethelehem. For her help, insights, and strength in
the formation and articulation of ideas presented in this paper.
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FRAMING FANON

Born and raised in the French colony of Martinique, Frantz Fanon
describes himself as a postcolonial subject situated both within a deeply
racialized French colonial context and a racialized sense of self.1 Fanon’s
publications Black Skin, White Masks (1952) and The Wretched of the
Earth (1961) are widely considered two of the most relied upon works to
obtaining a fundamental understanding of anti-colonial liberation
struggles; and his central ideas continue to speak to our current age.2 His
scholarship expresses how colonial racism, and the resulting
dehumanization, creates complications of identity for the colonial subject.
Fanon examines the ways in which the colonial mentality devalues black
consciousness and relies on case studies of anti-Black racism in France
and the French West Indies to show how the adoption of the French
language and cultural norms lead the colonized to participate in one’s own
oppression and alienation.3 The Wretched of the Earth foregrounds the
notion that colonialism is not an accidental formation; rather, the colonial
world is a “Manichaean world”4 with a binary division between good and
evil and is distinctly relevant to modern structures of power.5
I interrogate the relationship between Fanonian concepts and the racist
language in American Indian case law because Fanon positions race and
the hierarchy of race at the center of his analysis on anti-colonial
resistance. Fanon writes:
The singularity of the colonial context is that economic
reality, inequality, and the immense difference of ways of
life never come to mask the human realities. When you
examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident
that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of
belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given
species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also
a superstructure.6
As it relates to the colonial oppression, Fanon understands that
whiteness operates as both a political ideology and as a point of relation to
1

See FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Richard Philcox trans., Grove Press
2008) (1952).
2
See generally id., FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (Richard Philcox
trans., Grove Press 2005) (1961) (in his foreword, Homi K. Bhabha discusses the liberating
influence of Fanon’s scholarship on revolutionaries such as: Bobby Seale, Huey Newton,
Steve Biko, Bobby Sands, and Ali Shariati).
3
See FANON, supra note 1.
4
See e.g., FANON, supra note 2, at xiii.
5
See generally id.
6
Id. at 5.

300 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:2

private property and capital.7 Further, Fanon values an understanding of
decolonization outside of academia and the administration of law. He
highlights the necessity of the colonized to overcome the alienation
produced by colonial oppression outside of the culture and intellectual
possessions of the colonizer. Stated differently, Fanon adheres to the
principle that decolonization is always a violent event and an agenda for
total disorder within the colonial situation.8 I rely on Fanon in my analysis
because he offers a lens in which violent, indigenous opposition to
dispossession and disempowerment brought by colonialism can serve as a
means to overturn feelings of alienation. Most importantly, Fanon’s vision
of a just society is one that demands an end to economic exploitation,
imperialism, racism and other systems of oppression that do not embrace
the principle that every human is of worth.

II.

“THE SAVAGE AS THE WOLF”

“ . . .the gradual extension of our settlements will as certainly cause
the savage, as the wolf, to retire; both being beasts of prey, though they
differ in shape.”9 I begin with this quote from George Washington because
I understand it to be a perfect illustration of the western colonial
imagination on which the United States was founded. To fully understand
how justices on the Supreme Court have constitutionally legitimized a
white racial dictatorship in the United States, we must first look to the
origination of the racist language employed by Washington, the founding
fathers, and the other white colonial-settlers responsible for the genocide
of Indigenous nations. Racial dictatorship in this context could be
understood as:
. . . a coercive form of racial rule by whites who sought
to legally eliminate all nonwhites from the sphere of
political and civil society in the United States. The
presumed racial inferiority and incompatibility of these
nonwhite “others” disqualified them from full and equal
participation in the superior form of civilization
established for the enjoyment of the white race by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.10

7

See generally infra note 23.
See FANON, supra note 2, at 2.
9
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 42 (2005).
10
Id. at 31.
8
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The use of “savagery” as an identifier can be traced back to
Enlightenment thinkers such as Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke, who
hypothesized philosophical frameworks that relied on the American Indian
as an example of man in his most unrefined savage state.11 The idea of the
American Indian as an incommensurable being formed the foundation of
“the struggle between civilization and barbarism in the Western colonial
imagination,” freeing Europeans from the restraints of Exodus 21:12.12 As
noted by Williams, this Enlightenment–era European racial consciousness
enabled the West to move past its faux religious convictions that value the
unity of mankind and precipitated a shift towards ruthless colonization of
recently “discovered” lands full of “strange,” people committed to
maintaining their identity of “savagery.”13
Omi and Winant hypothesize that the conquest of the American Indian
was a significant and distinct repositioning of European’s historical
understanding of the “Other.”14 Manifest destiny marked the consolidation
of the will to exploit, dominate, and appropriate the “Other” through
organized frameworks such as religion, science, and political economy
that were not perpetuated toward other non–European peoples.15 The
maintenance of the white racial dictatorship in the United States through
the organized weaponization of the “Other” has provided racial
dictatorships outside of the U.S. with a blueprint for subjugation that can
be followed, validating Omi and Winant’s hypothesis.16
Williams writes, “The language of Indian savagery could be
evocatively manipulated to cast any of these essential savage character
traits as noble virtues of primitive simplicity. But savagery itself possessed
no ultimate redeeming value for the Indian.”17 A review of developing
American superstructures makes clear that the racial imagination of
European colonists as it relates to Native Americans is shaped and molded
to affirm racial perceptions that justify discourses of manifest destiny and
national identity.18 From the 17th to the late 18th commentaries on white
victimhood and the capture of Euro–Americans settlers by Native tribes

11

Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
13
Id. at 33.
14
See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 62 (2d ed. Routledge 1994).
15
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 35.
16
See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW (2017); FAYEZ A. SAYEGH, ZIONIST COLONIALISM IN
PALESTINE (1965).
17
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 35–36.
18
See generally RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE
MYTHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1600–1800 (1973).
12
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served as the introduction of American Indian “savagery” to American
secular literature.19
In the nineteenth century, the conception of the Indian as a “savage”
in American popular media oscillates between two varieties: 1) the “noble
savage” whose closeness to the state of nature is overly romanticized and
2) the alienated, unsaved Indian “savage” casted as an anti-hero for the
tales of the Wild West.20 By the 20th century, this foundational language
of Indian savagery pushed mass-market media culture to make profitable
and digestible caricatures of Indians as uncivilized people. This image is
juxtaposed with the superiority of the white man or canonized tales of
cross-cultural understanding between Native people and European
settlers.21 It is important to recognize the influence of popular media
representation as a superstructure that not only informs the broader society
but also the judicial decision making of Supreme Court justices.
These long–established stereotyped roles and their ritualized
construction of racialized and commodified ethnic identities are an
inescapable and pervasive part of the metastasizing, conglomerating mass
media, market culture that just about every child in America, including
those who grow up to become Supreme Court justices, get exposed to at a
very early age.22
An awareness of the pervasive and explicit racialization of Native
people through colonial superstructures such as religion, politics,
literature, and media in the early colonial period of the United States is
fundamental in understanding how political power structures such as the
Supreme Court, validate and legitimize white racial superiority.

III.

RACIST LANGUAGE AND PRECEDENT IN AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW

The language of Indian “savagery” and the growth of the Indian
“savage” in popular discourse is deeply embedded in the culture of the
colonial era and the formation of a national identity in the United States.
Foreseeably, the steadfast beliefs in white superiority and Indian savagery
became central organizing principles in the decisions made by the
Supreme Court when addressing questions related to Indian rights.23
19

See JUNE NAMIAS, WHITE CAPTIVES: GENDER AND ETHNICITY ON THE AMERICAN
FRONTIER 132 (1993).
20
SHARI M. HUHNDORF, GOING NATIVE: INDIANS IN THE AMERICAN CULTURAL
IMAGINATION (2001).
21
See WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 35.
22
Id. at 36-37.
23
Id. at 48.
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Relying upon the same language of white superiority used by Washington,
the Supreme Court under Justice Marshall issued three major opinions on
Indian rights, Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and
Worcester v. Georgia. As Williams writes, these three 19th century cases
formed the foundation of the Marshall Model of Indian Rights, which
continues to shape the Court’s approach to all questions of Indian tribal
rights and sovereignty. 24

a.

Johnson v. McIntosh25

The issue in Johnson v. McIntosh was that both parties claimed that
they had legitimate title to a tract of land. Johnson’s title was granted to
him by Piankeshaw Indians in exchange for a sum of money and the
United States government sold a portion of the same land to McIntosh.26
The Court unanimously held that land title transferred by Indian tribes to
private individuals prior to the American Revolution are not recognized.
In Whiteness as Property, Cheryl Harris notes that “the issue specifically
presented was not merely whether Indians had the power to convey title,
but to whom the conveyance could be made—to individuals or to the
government that ‘discovered’ the land.”27 The Court reasoned that Indian
title was subordinate to European “discovery” of Indian tribal land giving
title to “the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority it was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.”28 Johnson is regarded as one of the most
important Indian rights opinions because of the Court’s validation of the
doctrine of discovery. Under the doctrine of discovery, the exclusive right
to title of Indian territory either by conquest or by purchase, transferred
from Great Britain to the United States following the Revolutionary War.29
Although the Piankeshaw tribe were indigenous to the land, Marshall
and the Supreme Court unanimously decided that the racial and cultural
otherness of Native tribes struck out any basis for asserting a right to the
land in dispute.30 Put simply, the doctrine of discovery allowed the Court
to deny Indian tribes the same property rights as Europeans because
Indians were regarded as an inferior race under the European Law of
Nations.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 48-49.
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
Id. at 557-558.
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 573.
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 53.
Harris, supra note 27, at 273.
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Further, Johnson’s interpretation of the rights of the conqueror
established whiteness as a prerequisite to the exercise of enforceable
property rights in the United States. In the opinion Marshall discusses the
inevitability of European conquest:
. . . the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were
fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose
subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave
them in possession of their country, was to leave a
wilderness, to govern them as a distinct people, was
impossible . . . .31
The use of the familiar language of Indian savagery is clear throughout
the text of Marshall’s opinion.32 To justify his assertions, Marshall points
to “the character and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested
from them”33 as a justification for the “principles which Europeans have
applied to Indian title . . . “34 The Chief Justice also characterized the
dispossession of Native land and history by European colonization as
follows: “Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not always
the aggressors, unavoidably35 ensued. European policy, numbers, and skill
prevailed. As the white population advanced, that of the Indians
necessarily36 receded.”37
The unmasked validation of the necessity of violence and elevation of
the European colonial-fantasy of a white racial dictatorship over non-white
people in Johnson serves as a principle of the U.S. legal system.38 Here,
Fanon’s analysis of violence is particularly relevant to Marshall’s opinion.
Fanon’s support of violent revolutionary struggle is drawn from his
analysis of the central and inescapable role of violence in the maintenance
of colonialism. Using a Fanonian lens, Marshall employs violent language
as an immutable component in the relationship between the oppressor and
the oppressed.39
In colonial regions, however, the proximity and frequent
direct intervention by the police and the military ensure
31

McIntosh, 21 U.S at 590.
Id. at 563.
33
Id. at 589.
34
Id.
35
Id. (emphasis added).
36
Id. (emphasis added).
37
Id. at 590.
38
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 56; see generally Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403405 (1856); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
39
FANON, supra note 2, at 34.
32
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the colonized are kept under close scrutiny and contained
by rifle butts and napalm. We have seen how the
government’s agent uses a language of pure violence. The
agent does not alleviate oppression or mask domination.
He displays and demonstrates them with the clear
conscience of the law enforcer and brings violence into
the homes and minds of the colonized subject.40
In this case, the Supreme Court exists as the “government’s agent”41
that utilizes a language of pure violence to enforce law and dominate the
colonized subject. We can also look to Fanon’s theory of the
compartmentalized world to understand Marshall’s representation of the
dichotomy between European and Indigenous frameworks of society.42
For Fanon, the Native and European sectors are mutually exclusive and
challenging the colonial world cannot be categorized as a rational
confrontation of viewpoints.43 Rather, it is a direct confrontation of two
separate and opposing realities. His support for this draws from the fact
that the colonist not only physically limits the space of the colonized, but
the colonist also turns the colonized subject into the “quintessence of
evil . . . [a] corrosive element . . . distorting everything which involves
aesthetics or morals . . . .”44 “The ‘native’ is declared impervious to ethics,
representing not only the absence of values but also the negation of
values . . . . In other words, absolute evil.”45

b.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia46

In 1831, the Cherokee nation under Article III of the Constitution filed
suit against the state of Georgia to prevent the state from executing or
enforcing the laws of Georgia within Cherokee territory.47 The complaint
asserted that the state of Georgia had no authority over the Cherokee
nation because it is composed of sovereign and independent states with
exclusive rights to their territory and self-government.48 Various treaties
between the United States and the Cherokee nation that support Cherokee
sovereignty are referred to in the complaint.49 However, the case turned on
40

Id. at 4.
Id.
42
See generally FANON, supra note 2.
43
Id. at 6.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
30 U.S. 1 (1831).
47
See id. at 1, 10.
48
Id. at 1-2.
49
Id. at 2 (“That various treaties have been, from time to time, made between the
confederate states afterwards; and finally, between the United States under their present
41
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the jurisdictional question of whether the Cherokee and Native tribes more
broadly, can be constituted as “foreign states” under Article III of the
Constitution. Justice Marshall held that “the Cherokee nation is not a
foreign state, in the sense in which the term ‘foreign state’ if used in the
constitution of the United States.”50 Rather, the Court determined that
Native tribes were akin to “domestic dependent nations.”51 Under
Cherokee, Native tribes under U.S. law, “occupy a territory to which we
assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian.”52 According to Marshall, Indian tribes at the time
the constitution was drafted were “tomahawk”53 wielding savages. Thus,
the framers of the constitution did not have Indian tribes in view when
providing an avenue for “foreign states” to utilize our courts under Article
III.54
The Court’s ruling that Indian tribes could not be regarded as ‘foreign’
nations under the Constitution meant that the Cherokees, in Marshall’s
words, ‘cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United States.’
Though Georgia’s laws, as pleaded by the tribe, sought ‘directly to
annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of
Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by the
United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force,’ the
Constitution, according to the holding of Cherokee Nation and the
Marshall Model of Indian Rights, literally left them incapable of defending
themselves before the Supreme Court from the state-sponsored acts of
what Remnard Strickland has called ‘genocide-at-law’.55
Similar to Johnson, Cherokee is an example of rights-denying
jurisprudence that subjected Tribal nations to inferior political status under
the Constitution. Further, Cherokee extended the Marshall Model of
Indian Rights through the trust doctrine and guardian-ward relationship.56
The trust doctrine further relegated Indian tribes to the political
constitution, and the Cherokee nation, as well as other nations of Indians: in all of which
the Cherokee nation, and other nations have been recognized as sovereign and independent
states; possessing both the exclusive right to their territory, and the exclusive right of selfgovernment within that territory.”).
50
Id. at 11.
51
Id. at 13.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 61.
56
Secretarial Order No. 3335. Reaffirmation of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Federally Recognized Tribes and Individual Indian Beneficiaries, U.S. Dept. of Interior
(Aug. 20, 2014).
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sovereignty of the United States by recognizing Tribes as entities that are
distinct from states and foreign nations, establishing the federal
government as the “protector” of tribal land, assets, resources, and other
recognized rights.57
Fanon’s discussion on “The So-Called Dependency Complex of the
Colonized” in Black Skin White Masks58 is particularly relevant to the
colonial violence perpetuated under Cherokee. I understand the outcome
of this case to be analogous to the inferiority complex facing many of
Fanon’s patients as a result of colonization.
What Monsieur Mannoni has forgotten is that the
Malagasy no longer exists: he has forgotten that the
Malagasy exists in relation to the European. When the
white man arrived in Madagascar, he disrupted the
psychological horizon and mechanisms. As everyone has
pointed out, alterity for the black man is not the black but
the white man.59
The establishment of the “guardian-ward” relationship in Cherokee
embodies Fanon’s assertion that upon colonization, the indigenous person
no longer exists.60 They only exist in relation to the colonizer.61 According
to Justice Marshall, Tribal nations only exist in relation to a territory in
which only the colonial government may assert title. Despite Cherokee
nation, “toe[ing] the line of the white world as quickly as possible”62 by
utilizing a violent colonial institution like the federal courts, Cherokee’s
outcome further entrenched Native peoples into their status as a colonized
subject. Holding that the Cherokee nation could not maintain an action in
federal court as a foreign state resulted in the dismantling of Cherokee
political society and the seizure of Cherokee lands despite assurances
made valid through treaties with the United States.63

c.

Worcester v. Georgia64

In the final case of the Marshall Model, the Supreme Court addressed
whether the federal government or an individual state had the “exclusive
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id.
FANON, supra note 1, at 64.
Id. at 77.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 78.
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 61.
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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conquest.”65 Williams notes, “Worcester would decide, once and for all,
which level of colonial government, state or federal . . . “ would have
superior authority under the doctrine of discovery established in Johnson
to impose laws on Indian nations.66 Worcester held that Georgia state laws
have no force in Cherokee nation because the “intercourse between the
United States and this nation,”67 is constitutionally vested in the federal
government.68 Writing for the court, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that
the Georgia law requiring individuals living on Cherokee land to obtain a
permit and take an oath of allegiance were in direct conflict with treaties
between the Cherokee nation and Georgia.69 The Georgia state law also
interfered with the federal government’s responsibility to “protect”
Cherokee nation.70 Conveniently, the court openly affirms the validity of
treaties that were denied in Cherokee a year prior because doing so
supported the consolidation of jurisdictional authority under the federal
government.
The court also continued to rely on the language of savagery to justify
the federal government’s monopoly on “colonial governmentality.”71 One
of the relied upon Crown charters quoted in the opinion states:
“ . . .and whereas our provinces in North America have
been frequently ravaged by Indian enemies, more
especially that of South Carolina, which, in late war by
the neighbouring savages, was laid waste by fire and
sword, and great numbers of English inhabitants
miserably massacred; and our loving subjects, who now
inhabit there, by reason of the smallness of their numbers,
will, in case of any new war, be exposed to the like
calamities, inasmuch as their whole southern frontier
continueth unsettled, and lieth open to the said savages.”72
Marshall relies on various pre-revolutionary English Crown charters
to show that only the Crown possessed the right of discovery over Indian
tribes. Following the Revolutionary War, that power was now vested in
the federal government of the United States.73 While Worcester has been
considered an achievement for Indian rights because it limited states’
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823).
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 64.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 562.
Id.
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 70.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 558.
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abilities to enact violent policies directed towards Tribal nations, it relied
on the language of Indian savagery to “protect” Tribal nations from the
state while consolidating colonial power with the federal government.
Although one might be tempted to rationalize the racist language
used in the Marshall Model cases by opining “that was the reality of the
time,” the principles in these cases still hold weight in Federal American
Indian law today. In the final portion of this Comment, I will be discussing
Williams’ criticisms of how after Brown, judicial reliance on racist
precedent was rejected by the Supreme Court for other marginalized
groups but maintained for Indian tribes.

d.

Tee-Hit-Ton & Brown v. Board of Education

Brown v. Board of Education74 signals a “departure point”75 in the
struggle for racial equality in the United States.76 In Brown we see the
rejection of racist language used in Plessy v. Ferguson to justify the
oppression of Black people through the separate but equal doctrine.77
However, Williams writes:
Despite the rejection of the nineteenth century’s racist
precedents and hostile stereotypes directed against blacks
and despite the supposed benevolent racial paradigm shift
represented by the twentieth-century Supreme Court’s
landmark civil rights decision in Brown, nothing had
really changed in the way justices talked about Indians
and their rights. These two important decisions
unembarrassedly and unhesitatingly draw on the same
legal precedents and language of racism used by the
nineteenth-century Supreme Court to deny Indians their
asserted rights under U.S. law.78
In Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, members of the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians
in Alaska brought a Fifth Amendment claim seeking compensation from
the United States government because the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
sold timber from an area belonging to the Tribe.79 The area contained over
350,000 acres of land and 150 square miles of water.80 If the Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians succeeded, the case could have potentially resulted in as much as
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 86.
Id.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 87.
348 U.S. 273 (1955).
Id.
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$9 billion in just compensation claims awarded to Indian tribes who had
faced or were presently facing similar acts of dispossession.81 The TeeHit-Ton tribe contended that following the United States purchase of
Alaska, Congressional acts “confirmed and recognized [their] right to
occupy the land permanently and therefore the sale of the timber off such
lands constitutes a taking pro tanto of its asserted rights in the area.”82
Relying on the doctrine of discovery in Johnson, the Supreme Court held
that under the Constitution, the Tee-Hit-Ton tribe had no permanent legal
rights in the lands of Alaska “occupied by them by permission of
Congress.”83 Justice Reed also quotes a remarkably racist passage in a
1877 Supreme Court case to solidify the holding that the taking of Indian
title did not warrant compensation.
The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and
could not disturb the occupancy of the Indians: that
occupancy could only be interfered with or determined by
the United States. It is to be presumed that in this matter
the United States would be governed by such
considerations of justice as would control a Christian
people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent
race. Be that as it may, the propriety or justice of their
action towards controversy between third parties, neither
of whom derives title from the Indians. The right of the
United States to dispose of the fee of lands occupied by
them has always been recognized this court from the
foundation of the government.84
The language in Tee–Hit–Ton is judicial validation of the racist
conception of the Indian as a savage. The justifications provided in the
outcome of Tee–Hit–Ton, only a year after rejecting racist legal precedent
in Brown, illuminates the hypocrisy in federal judicial decisions. Fanon
writes “Inferiorization is the native correlative to the European’s feeling
of superiority. Let us have the courage to say: It is the racist who creates
the inferiorized.”85 The discrepancy between Brown’s rejection of racist
precedent and Tee–Hit–Ton’s reliance on Marshall’s language of savagery
informs us that not only is it the racist (i.e., the Supreme Court) who

81

DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICA: THE STORY
THEIR LAND 1867-1959, 26-28 (2003).
82
Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 277.
83
Id. at 278.
84
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877).
85
FANON, supra note 1, at 73.

OF
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creates the inferiorized, but the racist also determines when and which
victims of white racial violence are given their “rights.”

IV.

CONCLUSION

I chose to write this Comment because I believe that an understanding
of the history of racist American Indian law is a precursor to achieve
justice for Tribal nations and eventual abolishment of the Supreme Court
as a colonial institution. I do not believe Indigenous liberation, or any other
liberation movement will succeed through a “gentleman’s agreement”86
with the mechanisms that preserve white racial hierarchy.
Decolonization never goes unnoted, for it focuses on and
fundamentally alters being, and transforms the spectator crushed to a
nonessential state into a privileged actor, captured in a virtually grandiose
fashion by the spotlight of History. It infuses a new rhythm, specific to a
new generation of men, with a new language and a new humanity.
Decolonization is truly the creation of new men. But such a creation cannot
be attributed to a supernatural power: the ‘thing’ colonized becomes a man
through the very process of liberation.87
Federal courts have “crushed”88 Native people to a non-essential state.
The process of transforming Tribal nations from a non-essential state into
a privileged actor requires retirement of the Marshall Model, consistent
rejection of precedent that relies on racist white supremacist ideology, and
implementation of alternative methods of resolution that are led by Native
people.
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